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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals of
final agency orders pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 and §
78-2a-3(2) (j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1:

Was the Utah State Tax Commission correct in

affirming and sustaining the audit assessment for sales and use
tax of tangible personal property Petitioner used or consumed in
constructing a real property facility as prime contractor?
Standard of Review:
law.

This is a mixed question of fact and

The standard of review is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 59-

1-610(1) (Supp. 1994).

The Court must grant the Tax Commission

"deference concerning its written findings of factr applying a
substantial evidence standard on review."

The Court grants no

deference concerning its conclusions of law, applying a
correction of error standard.
ISSUE NO. 2:

Was the Tax Commission correct in disregarding

a paragraph in the Joint Stipulation of Facts, when the weight of
the evidence contradicted it?
Standard of Review:
law.

This is a mixed question of fact and

The standard of review is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 59-

1-610 (1) (Supp. 1994).

The Court must grant the Tax Commission

"deference concerning its written findings of fact, applying a
substantial evidence standard on review."
1

The Court grants no

deference concerning its conclusions of law, applying a
correction of error standard.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 (Supp. 1996).
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (Supp. 1996).
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1989).
Utah Code Ann. §

59-12-107 (Supp. 1996).

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (Supp. 1996).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(e)(ii) (Supp. 1996).
Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19S-58 (Supp. 1996)
Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19S-2 (Supp. 1996)
Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19S-23.E. (Supp. 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Yeargin filed an appeal in the Tax Commission for
reconsideration of an audit for sales and use tax. A formal
hearing was held on March 13, 1997. The Commission issued its
Final Division in affirming and sustaining the audit on April 14,
1997.
On May 7, 1997, Yeargin filed a Complaint and Petition for
Review by Trial De Novo of Final Decision of State Tax Commission
in the Third District Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1601(1996).
On October 30, 1997, Yeargin filed a Motion to Remand to Tax
Commission in the Third District Court in an effort to transfer

2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
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("PEPCON") (R. at 88).

Western Electrochemical Company

("WECCO") is a wholly owned subsidiary of PEPCON which owns
the ammonium perchlorate facility in Iron County (Tr. at 6667).

The Agreement establishing the responsibilities of

Yeargin identifies the work to be done by the contractor as:
Contractor shall perform, as necessary for completion
of the Project, the detailed design and engineering
(including preparation of plans, specifications,
construction drawings and estimates); shall, procure,
deliver and install permanent materials and, equipment;
shall procure and deliver construction equipment,
supplies, tools; shall provide supervisory services and
labor; and shall perform changes, if any, pursuant to
GC-3; all in accordance with the terms of this
Agreement (the Work).
at 21, 163) .
In approximately May 1991, the Auditing Division of the Utah
State Tax Commission conducted an audit of Yeargin (Tr. at
81, 83). Documents reviewed by an auditor included purchase
orders, purchase order status reports, checks, ledgers, and
sales tax returns (Tr. at 82, 85-85, 89-90, 91, 101-103).
After reviewing and analyzing these documents, the Auditing
Division issued a Statutory Notice with an accompanying Utah
Sales and Use Tax Audit Summary dated September 17, 1992 (R.
100-133).

The Audit Summary listed itemized transactions

which the Auditing Division determined as taxable. The
total tax due was $67,827.86 (R. at 102). Ron Jacobsen,
Senior Auditor with the Auditing Division, reviewed each
document itemized on the schedules accompanying the Audit
4
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Yeargin acknowledged it had taxable purchases by filing Utah
State Quarterly Sales and Use Tax returns from October 1988
through December 1989 (R. at 135-142), (Tr. at 93-94).

All

of the purchases scheduled in the Audit Summary traced the
accrual records of Yeargin to invoices or other supporting
documentation and were scheduled only for the Cedar City
facility (Tr. at 95, 97). All purchase orders and checks
reviewed as supporting documents to the scheduled items in
the Audit Summary belonged to Yeargin (Tr. at 98, .111, R. at
143, 204-211, 213-217, 219-221).
10.

Following the formal hearing, the Tax Commission issued its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision,
attached as Addendum A.

The Findings of Fact included:

a.

The tax in question is sales and use tax.

b.

The period in question is October 1988 through December
1989.

c.

During the course of construction of the facility, PPI
and WECCO entered into an agreement with United
Engineers and Constructors, Inc., and its affiliate,
Yeargin, for purpose of providing assistance in the
engineering, design and procurement for the
construction of the AP manufacturing facility.

United

Engineers assisted WECCO in purchasing materials for
use in the construction of the facility and located

6
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been a party to the contract, the actions of Petitioner
determine the taxability of purchases, and not the
written agreement, especially if the provisions of the
agreement were not followed.
Notwithstanding paragraph GC-17 of the Agreement,
paragraph A-l of the Agreement provides the contractor
(United or Yeargin) is to "procure, deliver and install
permanent materials and equipment."

The evidence

submitted in this proceeding is clear that Petitioner
did procure many of the materials and install them into
the project.
Yeargin also issued an exemption certificate to the
vendors of some of the materials.

Exemption

certificates were not appropriately issued for any
materials which were not resold or which Petitioner
installed into real property.
There is no evidence, or even an allegation, that WECCO
or any other company paid the sales tax on the
materials at issue in this proceeding.
The only items on which sales tax has been imposed upon
Petitioner by Respondent are those materials which were
invoiced to Petitioner and/or were paid for by checks
of Petitioner.
In performing the audit, Respondent looked only at who

8
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Substantial evidence exists in the record to justify the
factual findings of the Commission that Yeargin consumed and was
liable for those purchases.

Contractual provisions, and the

weight of the evidence defends the Commission's decision, and
even if the parties are bound to a joint stipulation of facts,
the Commission had the power to set that aside in the face of
justifiable cause and contrary evidence.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT MUST GIVE DEFERENCE TO THE TAX COMMISSION'S
FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUDING THAT YEARGIN, INC., AS A
REAL PROPERTY CONTRACTOR, VENDOR, OR USER, WAS
RESPONSIBLE FOR COLLECTING AND REMITTING SALES OR USE
TAX ON ALL TRANSACTIONS IN THE AUDIT.

Petitioner was a real property contractor for the
construction of the WECCO facility (the "Work" or "the Project"
as Referenced in the Transcript and Pleadings).

Items of

tangible personal property purchased by the Petitioner, which
were included on Schedule 1 of the Audit Summary, were converted
to real property by the Petitioner (R. at 9, 21, 105-108, 163),
(T. at 31, 85-89, 91-92).
The Tax Commission found that "[i]n addition to assisting
WECCO, United Engineers and Yeargin actually purchased some of
the materials which were invoiced and billed to Yeargin and were
paid for by checks from Yeargin.

Yeargin ultimately installed

those materials into the real property of the WECCO facility or
consumed the materials in the construction process." (R. at 9 ) .

10

The sale of tangible personal property to real property
contractors is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103 and Utah
Code Admin. P. R865-19S-58 (Supp. 1996) . Utah law imposes a tax
against the purchaser for the amount paid or charged for tangible
personal property stored, used, or consumed in this state. Utah
Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1989).

The administrative rules of the

Tax Commission generally provide that the person who converts the
personal property into real property is the consumer of the
personal property, since that person is the last one to* own it as
personal property. Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19S-58 (Supp. 1996).
As the installation contractor, Petitioner by law became the
ultimate consumer of the tangible personal property and is
therefore subject to the sales and use tax on the materials in
those transactions.
In Tummurru Trades v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715
(Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar claim by
a taxpayer who sought an exemption from sales tax on items that
were sold to out-of-state customers.

Tummurru was in the

business of constructing and selling modular buildings. The
company made a number of sales to out-of-state customers,
transported the modular units to the site, and then Tummurru's
construction arm installed the buildings on-site.

In holding the

taxpayer liable for the sales taxes on the transactions, the Utah
Supreme Court applied a principal first discussed in Utah

11

Concrete Products Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 125 P.2d 402
(Utah 1942), and supported by later decisions, that contractors
are the ultimate consumers of the items they purchase for
incorporation into real property. E.C. Olsen Co. v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 168 P.2d 324 (Utah 1946), BJ-Titan Services v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n. 842 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), Chicago Bridge & Iron
Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303 (Utah 1992).
Paragraph A-l of the Agreement between WECCO and Petitioner
defines the work to be done by Petitioner:
Contractor shall perform, as necessary for completion
of the project, the detailed design and engineering
(including preparation of plans, specifications,
construction drawings, and estimates); shall procure,
deliver and install permanent materials and eouipment;
shall procure and deliver construction equipment,
supplies, tools; shall provide supervisory services and
labor; and shall perform changes, if any, pursuant to
GC-3; all in accordance with the terms of this
Agreement (the Work). (Emphasis added.)
Petitioner was a real property contractor, and as such made
purchases of all items included in the Audit Summary.

The Record

supports, and the Tax Commission found that Petitioner was the
purchaser or user of those materials in Schedule 1 of the Audit
Summary as an ultimate consumer, by installing those materials
into real property at the WECCO facility, or, having consumed
items of tangible personal property (Schedule 2 of the Audit
Summary).

Sub-argument "A" below explains this reasoning, which

should be adopted.

But even if the Court rejects it, Sub-

arguments "B" and "C" demonstrate how Petitioner will still be
12

liable for sales or use tax on all transactions in the audit.
The Tax Commission's Findings of Fact were Based
on Substantial Evidence and the Failure of the
Petitioner to Marshal Evidence to the Contrary
Requires this Court to Sustain the Tax
Commission's Final Decision.
The Tax Commission in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Lawf and Final Decision, attached hereto as Addendum A, found:
a.

The evidence submitted in this proceeding is clear that
the Petitioner did procure many of the materials and
install them into the project. (R. at 10-11).

b.

"Yeargin... issued an exemption certificate to the
vendors of some of the materials.

Exemption

certificates were not appropriately issued for any
materials which were not resold or which Petitioner
installed into real property." (R. at 11).
c.

"There is no evidence, or even an allegation, that
WECCO or any other company paid the sales tax on the
materials at issue in this proceeding." (R. at 11).

d.

"The only items on which sales tax has been imposed
upon Petitioner by Respondent are those materials which
were invoiced to Petitioner and/or were paid for by
checks of Petitioner." (R. at 11).

e.

"Petitioner converted the materials to real property,
or personally consumed the materials in the
construction of the project." (R. at 11).
13

Utah Code Ann.

§ 59-1-610 (Supp. 1996) establishes the

standard of review of an appellate court:
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings
commenced before the commission, the Court of Appeals
or Supreme Court shall:
(a) grant the Commission deference concerning its
written findings of fact, applying a substantial
evidence stands on review; and
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning
its conclusions of law, applying a correction of error
standard, unless there is an explicit grant of
discretion contained in a statute at issue before the
appellate court.
(2) This section supercedes Section 63-46b-16
pertaining to judicial review of formal adjudicative
proceedings.
Under the "substantial evidence" test, the reviewing court
shall "grant the commission deference concerning its written
findings of fact, applying a substantial evidence standard."
"Substantial evidence" is that quantum and quality of relevant
evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to
support a conclusion.

First National Bank of Boston v. County

Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799 P. 2d 1163 (Utah
1992).

Substantial evidence is "more than a mere ^scintilla' of

evidence . . .
evidence.'"

though ^something less than the weight of the

(Citations omitted).

Grace Drilling v. Board of

Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989).
The "substantial evidence" test requires review of the whole
record, including evidence that both supports the agency's
factual findings and evidence that fairly detracts from the

14

weight of the evidence. Id. at 68. This does not mean that the
Commission need grant equal weight to all the evidence.

Ouestar

Pipeline Company v. Utah State Tax Commfn, 850 P.2d 1174 (Utah
1993).

In the past, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the

"substantial evidence" test "requires us to uphold an agency's
factual findings if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence."

Zissi v. State Tax Commission of Utah, 842 P.2d 848

(Utah 1992) .
The burden of proof lies with the party appealing the
administrative order. Id. at 852. The challenging party must
"marshal all of the evidence supporting findings and show that
despite the supporting facts and in light of the conflicting
contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence."

Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68. This

Court has held that:
Successful challenges to findings of fact thus must
demonstrate to appellate courts first how the trial
court found the facts from the evidence and second why
such findings contradict the weight of the evidence.
Oneida/SLC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d
1051, 1053 .(Utah App. 1994).

In describing the responsibility of

the challenger this Court noted:
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling
the evidence, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports
the very findings the appellant resists. After
constructing this magnificent array of supporting
evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw
15

in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the
court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly
erroneous. (Emphasis added.)
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315
(Utah App. 1991).

The Petitioner has failed to marshal the

evidence in accordance with these decisions.

The Findings of

Fact by the Tax Commission in it's Final Decision, even if not
sufficiently marshaled by the Petitioner in it's brief, easily
meets the substantial evidence standard (See Addendum A ) .

Thus,

the Tax Commission correctly concludes, "Therefore, it appears
clear to the Commission that Yeargin purchased the materials and
installed those materials into the real property at the Cedar
City facility or otherwise consumed those materials or supplies
in the construction of that project.

Under either event, sales

and use tax would be due and owing from the Petitioner." (R. at
15.)
B.

Irrespective of Petitioner's Contract or Agency
Arguments, Petitioner was Responsible to Collect
and Pay Sales or Use Tax on the Audited Non-Exempt
Transactions as a Vendor or Consumer.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a) provides:
There is levied
paid or charged
(a) retail
made within the

a tax on the purchaser for the amount
for the following:
sales of tangible personal property
state... (emphasis added).

As established previously, the Petitioner purchased all items
reflected on the schedules accompanying the Audit Summary (Tr. at
88, 101-104, 109-112), (R. at 143-144, 211-221).
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Sales tax is a

transactional tax.

Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19S-2 (Supp. 1996)

states:
A. The sales and use taxes are transactional taxes
imposed on certain retail sales and leases of tangible
personal property.... B. The tax is not upon the
articles sold or furnished, but upon the transaction,
and the purchaser is the actual taxpayer. The vendor is
charged with the duty of collecting the tax from the
purchaser and of paying the tax to the state.
This is the foundation of sales tax law in Utah. All
analysis begins with examining a specific transaction to first
determine if it falls within the tax imposition language of § 5912-103 and then, if taxable under that section, whether it is
specifically exempted from taxation under § 59-12-104.

It is

uncontested that all items listed in the Audit Summary are
taxable and that the amounts calculated are correct (Tr. at 1112, 85-86, 88, 101-104, 109-112).

Additionally, no information

was provided to contest that all audit items were not accounted
for, nor tax paid, by any other entity (Tr. at 90-91).
The transactions for which Petitioner sought refund were
purchases of either goods consumed by the Petitioner, or for
tangible personal property which was converted by Petitioner into
real property (R. at 6-11), (Tr.

at 78-79, 91, 97, 100-101).

Tax was properly imposed on those transactions, and the
Petitioner's request for refund was properly denied.
Invalid exemption certificates were supplied by the
Petitioner for purchases it made on tangible personal property
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later converted to real property by Petitioner (R. at 211-221),
(Tr.

at 101, 103).
The Utah Supreme Court has established the purpose of proper

tax collection administration in administering the Sales Tax Act
as follows:
For the purpose of the proper administration of this
chapter and to prevent evasion of the tax and the duty
to collect the tax, it shall be presumed that tangible
personal property or any other taxable item or service
under subsection 59-12-103(1), sold by any person for
delivery in this state is sold for storage, use, or
other consumption in this state unless the person *
selling such property, item, or service has taken from
the purchaser an exemption certificate signed by and
bearing the name and address of the purchaser to the
effect that the property, item, or service, was
exempted under § 59-12-104. The exemption certificates
shall contain information as prescribed by the
commission. (Emphasis added.)
Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715, 717
(Utah 1990) . The transactions identified in the Audit Summary
were taxable but for Yeargin's supplying exemption certificates
for the purchases it made.

(Tr. at 100, 103), (R. at 211, 216).

Regardless of Petitioner's arguments that it consummated the
purchases in the audit as agent for WECCO as the principal, or
for itself, tax liability still attaches to the Petitioner.

Tax

was due at the time of the purchase of each item in the audit.
The Petitioner, if not a real property contractor, was a vendor
required to collect and remit the tax at the time of each
transaction.
"The burden of providing that a sale is for resale or
18

otherwise exempt is upon the person who makes the sale.
If any agent of the Tax Division requests the vendor to
produce a valid exemption certificate or other similar
acceptable evidence to support the vendor's claim that
a sale is for resale or otherwise exempt, and the
vendor is unable to comply, the sale will be considered
taxable and the tax shall be payable by the vendor.
Utah Code Admin. P. R865-19S-23.E. (Supp. 1996).
Referencing that rule, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "The
purpose for the statutory requirement that merchants keep records"
of their sales and exemptions is to prevent tax evasion and tax
fraud.

In the instant case, the Tax Commission properly

determined that where Tummurru could not uphold its burden of
proving that the sales were made in interstate commerce or for
resale by providing records of exemption certificates, the sales
tax would be levied.

Tummurrufs failure to keep records

necessarily requires this result because oral testimony is not an
adequate substitute for accurate record keeping."
added.)

(Emphasis

Tummurru Trades, 802 P.2d at 718.

Here, the Petitioner was the presenter of exemption
certificates.

Therefore, in light of the invalidity of the

exemption certificates, Petitioner is absolutely liable for the
sales tax that was due and owing.

But for the presentation of

improper exemption certificates, no audit, hearing, or appeal
would have occurred.

The vendor would have collected the tax at

the time of the transaction in the absence of an exemption
certificate.
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If, indeed, the Petitioner made these purchases as an agent
for an undisclosed principal, it still cannot escape tax
liability.

It may have a cause of action to be indemnified for

that cost by the principal.

It is a fact that Yeargin was the

purchaser, regardless of whether title passed thereafter to the
another (R. at 10-11).

The entire argument about the capacity of

the Petitioner as an agent is a red herring.

Even if accepted,

which is not admitted here, such argument does not relieve the
Petitioner of its tax liability because it became a vendor of
tangible personal property in the string of transactions.
If, as Petitioner argues, it received title to the tangible
personal property from these transactions, and then transferred
title to WECCO as the ultimate consumer, it would now be liable
to collect and remit the tax as a vendor pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 59-12-107:
(2)(a) Each vendor shall collect the sales or use tax
from the purchaser.
None of the transactions referenced in the audit were allocated
to any other entity (Tr. at 90-91, 98-99, 111). Additionally,
purchases subject to a valid exemption were already credited and
excluded from the audit prior to the statutory notice (Tr. at 8687, 89). The unmistakable conclusion from this line of reasoning
is that even if Petitioner's arguments as to its agency capacity
were adopted by this Court, the Petitioner was still the
purchaser of the items (as found by the Tax Commission and
20

substantially proven by the evidence in the Record).

Regardless

of whether Petitioner is a real property contractor or an agent
for the owner, it cannot escape sales tax liability.
C.

In the Last Alternative, Petitioner is Liable for
Use Taxes Assessed to a User or Consumer Under
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(3).

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-107(3) states:
Each person storing, using, or consuming tangible
personal property under subsection 59-12-103(1) is
liable for the use tax imposed under this chapter.
The Petitioner received tangible personal property purchased in
transactions identified in the audit (R. at 10-11, T at 88-89,
101-104, 109-112).

Petitioner then either installed or consumed

the property so purchased (R. at 10-11).

Thus, the last person

to store, use or consume the tangible personal property before it
was converted to real property was the Petitioner.

For all items

included in Schedule 1 accompanying the Audit Summary, Petitioner
is liable for use tax since it used those goods.

This Court has

held, "If a vendor doing business in Utah meets any of the above
conditions, it must collect and remit sales and use taxes. Id.
If the vendor does not meet any of the conditions, the ^person
storing, using, or consuming tangible personal property is
responsible for remitting the use tax.' Id. 59-12-107 (1) (b)."
B.L. Key, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 934 P.2d 1164 (Utah App.
1997), referencing Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 916
P.2d 344 (Utah 1996).

By delivering exemption certificates to
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(1975); Johnson v. Peoples Finance & Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246,
272 P. id 171 (1954); Guard v. County of Maricopa, 14 Ariz. App.
187, 481 P.2d 873 (1971); Hiabv v. Hiabv, Colo. App., 538 P.2d
493 (1975); Thompson v. Turner, 98 Idaho 110, 55, P.2d 1071
(1977) [sic] ."

First of Denver Mtcr. Investors v. C.N. Zundel &

AS/ 600 P.2d 521, 528 (Utah 1979).
Petitioner in its Brief, pages 25-26, implies that a court
is required to render judgment consistent with the terms of a
stipulation.

Hialev v. McDonald, 685 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1984).

The quotation cited is simply a summary of that plaintiff's
position indicating that the rule precludes the adoption of
findings in conflict with the stipulated facts.

In the next

paragraph, the court states:
While Plaintiff accurately cites the rules in this
regard, we do not adopt his characterization of the
stipulation. According to the record, the extent to
which the parties stipulated respecting the deed survey
was that it could be admitted into evidence and that it
depicts the ^approximate' location of defendant's
mobile home. We cannot agree that the effect of this
stipulation was to bind or obligate the trial court to
apply the measurements and calculations on the deed the
survey in determining the location of the disputed
boundary. (Emphasis added.)
The general provision of the principal espoused in First of
Denver continues to be the legal precedent.
Notwithstanding the legal arguments, the Tax Commission,
being well aware of the provisions of the Joint Stipulation of
Facts, acknowledged the same in its Final Decision, and clearly
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articulated the greater weight of evidence produced which
contradicted Petitioner's interpretation, and found it necessary
to sustain and affirm the audit.

This Court should not find

justifiable cause to reverse that decision regarding the
stipulation.
Petitioner, in its Brief at page 35, appears to mischaracterize another Utah Supreme Court decision.

Petitioner

states, "A party may withdraw from a stipulation only on a motion
to the court.

Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d at 171." (Emphasis added.)

However, the Dove decision appears to the Respondent to reinforce
the First of Denver decision and does not hold that in the
absence of a motion to the court the court must follow the
stipulation.

Justice Durham stated in the Dove decision:

We have previously stated that "[plarties are bound by
their stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the
court, which has the power to set aside a stipulation
entered into inadvertently or for justifiable cause."
First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel and
Associates, Utah, 600 P.2d 521 (1979) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added). It is unlikely that a
stipulation signed by the counsel and filed with the
court was entered into inadvertently. Further,
although the trial court has certain discretion in
providing relief from a stipulation, if timely
requested, See Klein v. Klein, Utah, 544 P.2d 472, 476
(1975), "[ordinarily, courts are bound by stipulations
between parties." Zundel, 600 P.3d at 527 (citations
omitted). In this case, there is no indication that
the trial court found as a matter of fact that
plaintiff did not understand or agree to the
stipulation; nor did the trial court ground its
decision to permit withdrawal of the stipulation on any
legal or equitable basis. Klein, 544 P.2d at 476. In
the absence of any articulated "justifiable cause,"
Zundel, 600 P.2d at 527, we must reverse the withdrawal
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of the stipulation. (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis
added.)
This Court should find that there was justifiable cause, and
that it was within the discretion of the Tax Commission in light
of its evidentiary findings, to not rely on a contradictory
statement within the Joint Stipulation of Facts.
B.

The Evidentiary Burden of Proof Was the
Petitioner's, and it Failed to Meet That Burden or
to Shift it to Respondent.

Utah Code Admin. P. R861-1A-7.G. (Supp. 1996) states,
"Burden of Proof.

The Petitioning party shall have the burden of

proof to establish that his petition should be granted."

The

Utah Supreme Court also held in Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842
P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992), "Because a party appealing from an
order of an administrative agency must demonstrate that the
agency's factual determinations are not supported by substantial
evidence, (citation omitted) we state the facts and all
legitimate inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the agency's findings."
Petitioner attempts in its brief, specifically pages 11, 15
and 24, to shift the evidentiary burden to the Respondent.

In

light of the Petitioner's burden of proving that it's Petition
should be granted, it was obligated to prove by sufficient
evidence that the audit findings in the statutory notice were
incorrect.

At best, it's reliance on one paragraph of the Joint

Stipulation of Facts is the only hook upon which its argument can
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hang.
On the contrary, the testimony of Ron Jacobsen, witness for
the Auditing Division, is uncontested in the Record.

For each

item listed on the schedules, Mr. Jacobsen had a purchase order
from Yeargin, a check from Yeargin, and n^ver a WECCO check (Tr.
at 111). Also, Mr. Jacobsen testified that he did a 100% review
of every purchase order and that none of the invoices that were
part of the assessment against Yeargin were in fact issued by
PEPCON (or WECCO) (Tr. at 112).l
Other than raising doubt of that testimony in its Brief
before this Court, that testimony is uncontroverted.
Additionally, the testimony of Petitioner's witnesses failed to
substantiate the same kind of review on and/or repudiate the
individual entries in the schedules to the Audit Summary.
The Record reflects that even if the burden of proof had
successfully shifted from the Petitioner to the Respondent,
substantial evidence was presented by Respondent, and
insufficiently contradicted by Petitioner.
CONCLUSION
The Tax Commission correctly found that the actions of the

1

Mr. Jacobsen testified that files pertaining to purchase
orders covered a range in numeration, "purchase orders stated
with 1000 and went through 13000-something,..." (Tr. at 88.) He
did not allege he previewed 12,000 documents. It was clear
taking his testimony as a whole that he reviewed each applicable
documents. At a minimum, all entries on the schedules had all
supporting documents. (See Statement of Facts).
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Petitioner determined the taxability of purchases, not a written
agreement.

How Yeargin was reimbursed for its taxable purchases

is immaterial as well.

Yeargin, Inc., in the capacity as real

property contractor, vendor, or consumer, was responsible for tax
liability as established in the assessment.

Sufficient cause

existed both in legal and factual bases to practically disregard
a deficient section of the Stipulation of Facts.
Since the Petitioner has not met either its trial or
appellate burden of proof justifying a reversal, the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision of the Tax
Commission should be sustained in its entirety.
Dated this

ft?

day of November, 1998.

Gale Iv Francis/^
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Gale K. Francis, certify that on the

f&

day of

November, 1998, I served the parties listed below with 2 copies
each of the Brief of Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission by
mailing them by first-class mail with sufficient postage pre-paid
to the following:
ROBERT A. PETERSON, ESQ.
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BENDIGER & PETERSON
170 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 400
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
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ADDENDUM A

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

YEARGIN INC & WESTERN
ELECTRO CKEMICAL,
Petitioner,
v.
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

)
:
)

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW#
AND FINAL DECISION

)

Aopeal No. 93-0002
)un: No. H02516
Tax Tvoe:

Respondent.

Sales & Use Tax

,CTT
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t e Tax Corrimiss:

a Formal Hearing on March 13, 1997. 3. Blaine Davis, Administrative
law Judge, heard the matter for and on behalf of the Commission.
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resent m a retitioner were Mr. Ro.ce rt re:

the law firm of Giauque Crockett r±endmaer and Peterson, together
with

Mr.

Bill

Burke

and

Mr.

C.

Keith

Rooker.

present

representing Respondent were Mr. Gale Francis, Assistant Attorney
General, together with Mr. Brad Simpson, Mr. Bert Ashcrcft, Mr. Ron
Jaccbscn, and Ms. Marie Humphreys from the Auditing Division.

zasa:
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nearmg, one Tax Commission nereoy maKes its:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The tax in question is sales and use tax.

2.

The period

in question

is October

1988

through

December 198 9.
3.

Petitioner, Yeargin Inc., is a corporation organized,

existing, and m

good standing under the laws of the State of

Delaware, and was duly qualified to transact business and was in
good standina as a foreian corporation under the laws of the State

Western Electrochemical Ccmoanv (WEC

a. — o ^

wab

ci

^eiaware ^orocraticn ana was autnorizea to transact cusmess
CuOLt

5.

WECCO

is

a wholly

owned

subsidiary

Engineering and Production Company of Nevada

of

Pacific

PEPCCN; which, prior

to May 4, 1988, operated an ammonium perchlorate (AP) manufacturing
facility in Clark County, Nevada.

Prior to May 4, 1988, PEPCCN was

one of two domestic producers cf AP.

AP is a chemical that is

essential to a variety of national defense and space exploration
"crcorams.

•2-
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6.
the

On May 4, 1988, a series of fires and explosions at

PEFCON-AP

manufacturing

facility

resulted

in

the

total

destruction of PEPCON's facility and the loss of approximately onehalf of the United States' domestic AP production capacity.
7.
united

states

After the May 4, 1988 fires and explosions, the
^eoartment

or

Teiense

. DCD,

ano

tne

^aticna^

Aeronautic7s and Space Administration (NASA) determined that it was
essential

to national

security

and

space

exploration

that

the

nation's AP production capacity be replaced as soon as possible.
8.

After the fires and explosion of May 4, 1988, PEPCCN

lacked sufficient funds with which to rebuild or replace its A?
manufacturing

facility,

and

financing for this purpose.

was

unable

to

obtain

conventional

In order to expedite tne replenishment

of the nation's AP production capacity, contractors of NASA and DOD
made certain financing available to PEPCON Production Inc. (PPI),
an affiliate of PEPCCN.

The terms of the financing prohibited the

expenditure of the loan funds to purchase unon-severable" property,
or real property.
9.

The financing made available by contractors of NASA

-3-
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and the DOD was the sole source of construction funds for the AP
facility until permanent financing was obtained in March, 198 Q .
10.
facility

on

manufacturing

It was not possible to rebuild the AP manufacturing
the

site

that

facility.

miles west of Cedar City.
real property

construction funds.

been

occupied

by

the

PEPCON

After a brief but intensive search, a

suicacle site was located m

funds because

had

Iron County, Utah, approximately 15
PPI purchased the site with its own
was not

a permissible

use

of tne

Construction began at the Iron County site

m

July, 1988 and proceeded under the terms of a 2CD cricnty rating,
pursuant to the provisions of the Cefense Priority and Allocation
System Regulation
11.
permanent

15 C.F.R. 251 .

Curing

financing

tne

construction

continued.

When

period,

a

construction

search
was

for

nearly

complete, permanent financing was obtained from Security Pacific
Bank, Washington, N.A.
5, 1989.

The permanent financing was closed on Marcn

On that date, the lender required that PEPCON form WECCC

for the purpose of completing the construction of the facility and
thereafter operating the facility.

WECCO then succeeded PPI as tne

<fOUOi>038
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owner of the AF facility under construction.
of AP

at

the

new WECCO-AP

manufacturing

Initial manufacture
facility

occurred

in

August, 1989.
12.

During the course of construction of the facility,

?PI and WECCC entered into an agreement with United Engineers and
Constructors, Inc., and its affiliate, Yeargm,
providing assistance m
the

construct ion

of

for purpose of

the engineering, design and procurement for
the

AP

manufacturing

facility.

United

Engineers assisted WECCO in purchasing materials for use m

tne

construction of the facility and located suppliers, obtained price
quotations and arranged for WECCC to make purchases of materials.
In

addition

to

assisting

WECCC,

United

Engineers

and

Yeargm

actually purchased some of the materials wnich were invoiced and
billed

to

Yeargm

and

were

paid

for

by

checks

from

Yeargm.

Yeargm ultimately installed those materials into the real property
at the WECCO facility or consumed the materials in the construction
process.

The

contract

provides

that

title

to

all

materials

purchased for use at the WECCO facility would pass directly from
suppliers to WECCC, out the invoices and checks

indicate m a t some

- 5-
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of tne materials came to rest m
13 .

tne nands of Yeargin.

United Engineers placed one of its employees with

Yeargin to perform the purcnasmg function for the products for
WECCO.

That

employee

performed

those

purchasing

functions.

Paragraph 3C-17 of tne Agreement oetween PPI and United Engineers
ana Constructors Inc. , provided tnat "title to all material ana
eq^ip^ent

procured

cy

contractor

to

ce

incorporated

into

tne

prefect, snail pass to owner ^pen delivery to common carrier or at
tne project site, wnicnever is provided for m

tne purchase order."
Ever,

if

actions

cf

However, Petitioner was not a party to tnat contract.
Petitioner

nad

oeen

Petitioner

determine

a party
tne

to

tne

taxability

contract,

tne

of purchases,

and not

the

written agreement, especially if tne provisions of tne agreement
/vere net followea.
14.

Notwithstanding paragraph GC-1"7 of the agreement,

paragraph A-l of the agreement provides tne contractor
Yeargin

United or

is to "procure, deliver and install permanent materials

ana equipment;".

The evidence submitted

m

this proceeding is

clear tnat Petitioner did procure manv cf tne materials and install

0Glk,'01
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them into the project.
15.

Yeargin also issued an exemption certificate to the

vendors of some of the materials.

Exemption certificates were not

appropriately issued for any materials which were not resold or
which Petitioner installed into real property.
16.

There is no evidence, or even an allegation, that

V1ECC0 or any ether company paid the sales tax on the materials at
issue in this proceeding.
17.
uoon

The only items en which sales tax has been imposed

Petitioner

invoiced

to

by

Respondent

Petitioner

are

and/or

those

were

materials

paid

for

by

which

were

checks

of

Petitioner.
13.

In performing the audit, Respondent looked only at

who bought and paid for the materials.

The source of those funds

was not, and should not have been, material in determining whether
or not Petitioner should have paid sales tax Gn the materials.
19.

Petitioner converted the materials to real property,

or personally consumed the materials in the construction of the
cro-^ ect .

-7-
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APPLICABLE LAW
There

is a sales tax imposed upon the purchaser

amounts paid or charged

for retail

sales of tangible

for

personal

property made within the State of Utah rj.C.A. 59-12-103).
Property

purchased

for

resale

regular course of business, either m
ingredient

or

component

part

of

tangible

cf

personal

to

state

m

the

its original form or as an
or

compounded

U.C.A. 59-12 - 104 (27) •

construction
property

this

a manufactured

product is exempt from sales tax.
Sales

in

materials
real

and

property

other

items

contractors

of
and

repairmen of real property are subject to tax if the contractor cr
repairman converts the materials cr items to real property.

Rule

R865-19S-53, Utan Administrative Code;.
The contractor or repairman who converts the personal
property to real property is the consumer of tangible personal
property regardless of the type cf contract entered into between
the parties.

(Rule R865-19S-583.1, Utah Administrative Code).
ANALYSIS

In this case, Respondent made an audit assessment against

-8-
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Petitioner for additional sales and use taxes.

Petitioner has paid

the full amount of sales and use taxes, together with the interest
thereon, and Petitioner is now seeking a refund of approximately
$87,000 for the taxes and interest which it paid pursuant to the
audit.

If the audit assessment is correct, then Petitioner was not

entitled

to such

a refund.

If the

audit

assessment

was not

correct, then Petitioner is entitled tc a refund.
The position cf Petitioner is that it never made any
purchases cf products upon which it should have paid tax, because
the title tc those products passed directly to WECCO as provided by
the contract between WECCO, PEPCCN Production

Inc., and United

Engineers and Constructors, Inc.
Petitioner

furtner

relies

upon

paragraph

12

cf

tne

stipulation cf facts entered into between the parties in which it
was agreed

that

United

Engineers

assisted

WECCO

in purchasing

materials for use in the construction of the facility and located
suppliers, obtained price quotations and arranged for WECCO to make
purchases cf materials.

Therefore, Petitioner claims that its only

function was tc assist in obtaminc materials and that it did not

j;i)00b0i3
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actually obtain any such materials.

However, the interpretation of

the Commission of that stipulation is that although one of the
functions of United Engineering was to assist WECCO, that does not
foreclose the possibility that United Engineers (Yeargin) may have
itself purchased materials for the construction of the facility.
The Petitioner's interpretation of paragraph 12 is one possible
interpretation of the paragraph, but it is not the only possible
interpretation.

Further, Respondent has submitted evidence which

would indicate that Petitioner's interpretation of paragraph 12
does not accurately portray the facts as they were carried out by
the parties.
Petitioner also takes the position that everything was
purchased for the account of the owner, but there may have been
seme

mistakes

in

documentation

because

of

the

fast-track

requirements to try to get the plant built in a hurry to restore
the nation's AP production capacity.

Again, that does not comport

with the invoices billing items directly to Yeargin, and Yeargin
then paying those invoices from its funds.

That argument may be

persuasive if it were determined that the owner, either WECCC cr

-10-
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PEPCCN paid the tax on the materials, but there is no evidence to
indicate

that

any

other

entity

has also paid

the

tax on the

clear

Commission

materials purchased by Yeargin.
Therefore,

it

appears

to

the

that

Yeargin purchased the materials and installed those materials into
the real property at the Cedar City facility cr otherwise consumed
those materials or supplies m

the construction of that project.

Under either event, sales and use tax would be due and owing from
Petitioner.
DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that
the

audit

assessment

made

by Respondent

was

appropriate, that

Petitioner was responsible for the payment of such sales and use
taxes.

Petitioner

is therefore net entitled

to the requested

refund.

The request for refund is denied, and the audit assessment

0001,015
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is affirmed and sustained.
DATED this

'V

It is so ordered.
day of

/V r \wV

, 1997.

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of a final order
to file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission. If you
do not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, you
have thirty (30) days after the date of a final order to file a.)
a Petition for Judicial Review in the Supreme Court, or b. ) a
Petition for Judicial Review by trial de novo m district court.
(Utah Administrative Rule R861-1A-5(P) and Utah Code Ann. §§59-1601(1), 63-46b-13 et. sea.)
33D/SSH/S3-00C2 fcf
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